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faith according to the dictates of reason. In promoting agreement about 
Christian fundamentals, and in emphasizing the voluntary nature of reli-
gious association, Locke was acting in the spirit and reflecting the ethos of 
the amicable and humane republic of letters. Like his fellow writers, Locke 
was aware of how previous arguments for toleration had been damaged 
by charges of Socinianism; and this awareness ensured his own discretion 
on the subject of the Trinity. And Locke’s toleration was generally extend-
ed to Jews, to roman Catholics, and to Muslims, although his approaches 
to each of these traditions were, according to Marshall, couched in charac-
teristically careful language. Marshall supports the argument that, while 
Locke denied toleration to Catholics who honored papal political author-
ity, he nevertheless accepted the private worship of Catholics in Protestant 
states who rejected such authority. And he similarly argues that, although 
Locke denied toleration, on the same grounds, to the Islamic followers of 
the Mufti of Constantinople, he otherwise favored the toleration of Islam. 
For these and other approaches to Locke’s religion, Marshall’s study will 
long be essential reading.
God and the Reach of Reason: C. S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell, 
by erik J. wielenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. 
vii + 243. $75.00 (hardback), $21.99 (paper).
GreGOrY bASSHAM, king’s College (Pa.)
C. S. Lewis wrote extensively on philosophical issues. In books such as 
The Problem of Pain (1940), The Abolition of Man (1943), Miracles (1947), and 
Mere Christianity (1952), Lewis wrote at length about the problem of evil, 
the existence of God, the objectivity of moral judgments, the credibility 
of miracles, naturalism vs. supernaturalism, and other classic philosophi-
cal problems. Lewis, of course, was not a professional philosopher, and 
his apologetical books were directed at a general audience rather than at 
regular readers of Mind or Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Neverthe-
less, it can be asked whether Lewis’s philosophical writings are worthy of 
serious attention by professional philosophers.
Until very recently, the prevailing view has been that they are not. 
Lewis’s writings were mostly ignored by professional philosophers until 
the late 1970s, when Christian philosophers such as richard Purtill, Peter 
kreeft, and Gilbert Meilaender began urging that they be taken seriously. 
In the mid-80s, John beversluis’s sharply critical book, C. S. Lewis and the 
Rational Search for Religion (Eerdmans, 1985; rev. edition, 2007), seemed to 
many to clinch the case for seeing Lewis as a philosophical lightweight.
Today, the tide has turned, and there are a slew of books that make 
the case for Lewis’s merits as a philosopher. Among the most notable are: 
David Baggett, Gary R. Habermas, and Jerry L. Walls, eds., C. S. Lewis as 
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Philosopher (IVP, 2008), Adam barkman, C. S. Lewis and Philosophy as a Way 
of Life (Zossima Press, 2008), Gregory bassham and Jerry L. walls, eds., The 
Chronicles of Narnia and Philosophy (Open Court, 2005), and Victor reppert, 
C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea (IVP, 2003).
erik wielenberg’s God and the Reach of Reason is a valuable addition to this 
genre. wielenberg, an ethicist and philosopher of religion at DePauw Uni-
versity, is a clear-headed analytic philosopher who knows Lewis’s works 
and the relevant secondary literature well. His previous book, Value and Vir-
tue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge University Press, 2005), offers a careful 
exploration of the possibility of a secular ethics. In this book, wielenberg 
puts Lewis in conversation with two leading critics of Christianity, David 
Hume and bertrand russell. Lewis’s views on the problem of evil, argu-
ments for God’s existence, and the credibility of miracles are carefully un-
packed and juxtaposed with skeptical rejoinders from Hume and russell. 
In the book’s concluding chapter, surprising points of agreement between 
the three figures are explored. In the final analysis, Wielenberg concludes, 
Lewis’s arguments for Christian belief are not successful. but they are a 
good deal stronger than beversluis and other critics have claimed, and they 
are well worthy of attention from professional philosophers.
Wielenberg discusses in detail five major apologetical arguments of-
fered by Lewis: his responses to the problem of evil, his three leading 
arguments for God’s existence (the moral argument, the argument from 
reason, and the argument from desire), and his defense of miracles. For 
reasons of space, I shall focus on wielenberg’s discussion of two of these 
topics: the problem of evil and the argument from desire.
The Problem of evil. Critics of theism, such as Hume and russell, often 
argue that the facts of evil provide a strong reason to disbelieve in God. 
william rowe’s well-known argument that God would not permit gratu-
itous evil—roughly, evil that isn’t necessary for some greater good—is a 
powerful formulation of this evidentialist argument from evil.
Theists have responded to arguments such as rowe’s in one of three 
ways: (1) by denying that humans have good reason for thinking that 
gratuitous evils exist (the cognitive limitation defense), (2) by proposing 
various greater goods that might justify God’s permission of apparently 
gratuitous evils (the greater-good theodicy), and (3) by arguing that a per-
fect God might allow genuinely gratuitous evils to exist (the gratuitous 
evil theodicy).
which strategy does Lewis adopt? Michael Peterson has recently ar-
gued that Lewis opts for the third strategy—conceding that genuinely 
gratuitous evils exist, but claiming that they are justified by the great good 
of fallen spirits achieving personal transformation and a salvific fruition 
through their own free choices in a challenging natural environment that 
is more or less closed to divine intervention or alteration.1 wielenberg, by 
1Michael L. Peterson, “C. S. Lewis on the Necessity of Gratuitous evil,” in C. S. Lewis as 
Philosopher: Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, ed. David Baggett, Gary R. Habermas, and Jerry L. 
walls (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008), p. 189.
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contrast, argues that Lewis adopts the greater-good theodicy. On his read-
ing, Lewis’s main thrust is to show how God uses pain and other apparent 
evils for good ends, such as to punish us for our sins and to improve us by, 
for example, getting us to recognize our moral shortcomings and discour-
aging us from making ourselves too much at home in this passing world. 
In sum, Lewis claims that all the evil and suffering in this life will be jus-
tified by the final end of creation: the transcendent good of a heavenly 
society of beatified souls who have achieved this end through an arduous 
process of freely given love.
Is Lewis’s greater-good theodicy successful? Wielenberg finds much of 
it plausible, but notes one significant problem: its failure to deal convinc-
ingly with horrendous suffering by young children due to natural evils 
such as birth defects or natural disasters. Since such suffering can’t plau-
sibly be seen as either punitive or improving, why does God permit it? 
Is it because such suffering is outweighed by the great good of the final 
heavenly consummation? wielenberg takes this to be Lewis’s answer, but 
finds it unconvincing. Like Dostoevsky, Wielenberg believes that no cul-
minating good, however great, could justify certain kinds of child suffer-
ing (p. 51).
what wielenberg overlooks is that Lewis combines a greater-good 
theodicy with a cognitive limitation defense. For instance, in discussing 
animal pain, Lewis explicitly recognizes how little we can know about 
animal consciousness and animals’ divinely intended role in this life and 
(possibly) the next. I think Lewis would say much the same about non-
victim-improving child suffering. As Richard Purtill has noted, in the 
years following the publication of The Problem of Pain, Lewis expressed 
regret that he had not said more in that book about how even seemingly 
gratuitous suffering might mysteriously play a role in God’s redemptive 
plans.2 At the conclusion of The Problem of Pain, Lewis is careful to stress 
that “in some degree” God has given us data that enable us to understand 
our own suffering.3 Thus, he does not offer a full-fledged greater-good 
theodicy, but recognizes human cognitive limitations in grappling with 
the problem of evil.
The Argument from Desire. Lewis’s argument from desire (or argument 
from “Joy”) is a modified version of a stock medieval argument for life 
after death (see, e.g., Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, book 3, Chap. 48, 
para. 11). Medieval versions of the argument centered on humans’ “natu-
ral” desire for eternal happiness, a desire that, since “nature does nothing 
in vain,” must be fulfillable in another life. Lewis’s argument, by contrast, 
centers on a rare and fleeting bittersweet longing (“Joy”) that points, he 
claims, to a transcendent reality and ultimate source of happiness.
2richard Purtill, C. S. Lewis’s Case for the Christian Faith, rev. ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2004), p. 56 [quoting Letters of C. S. Lewis, ed. w. H. Lewis (New York: Harcourt brace 
Jovanovich, 1966), p. 234.].
3C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), p. 133. em-
phasis added.
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Lewis gives slightly different versions of the argument in Mere Christi-
anity, surprised by Joy, The Pilgrim’s Regress, and The Weight of Glory. No-
where, however, is the argument stated in detail, and commentators have 
disagreed about how it should be construed. wielenberg helpfully formu-
lates the argument as follows:
1. All normal human beings have an innate, natural desire (Joy) that is for 
some thing x, where x lies beyond the natural world.
2. every desire that is innate and natural to all normal human beings can be 
satisfied.
3. So: Joy can be satisfied (from 1 and 2).
4. If Joy can be satisfied, then there is something that lies beyond the natural 
world.
5. Therefore, there is something that lies beyond the natural world. (p. 110)
Thus formulated, the argument is deductive (and valid). As wielenberg 
correctly notes, however, Lewis argues inductively for the first two prem-
ises. In defense of (1), Lewis argues that Joy cannot be a desire for any 
natural object, because no natural object in his experience (or that of others 
as far as he knows) can satisfy it. He argues for (2) by inductive generaliza-
tion, claiming that all innate natural desires can be satisfied from the fact 
that paradigmatically innate natural desires such as our desires for food, 
sex, and sleep can be satisfied.
John beversluis has argued that Joy, in Lewis’s sense, is not a natural de-
sire, since many people, particularly in non-western cultures, have never 
experienced it. Nor, beversluis claims, is Joy properly described as a desire. 
(It’s not so much a wish or a desire as it is a sudden undirected emotion 
or feeling, a rush of adrenaline or “flutter in the diaphragm,” Beversluis 
thinks.) Wielenberg agrees that Lewis’s argument from desire is flawed, 
but finds fault with it on other grounds.
wielenberg notes that Lewis’s argument turns on an analogy between 
the types of instinctive biological desires he cites (desires for food, sex, 
drink, etc.) and the metaphysical desire he calls Joy. but this analogy is 
weak, he argues, because Joy falls not only in the category of “natural de-
sires,” but also into the category of “human desires for things that are not 
part of the known natural universe” (p. 113). For Lewis’s argument to suc-
ceed, he must show that all or most desires in this second category have 
objects that can satisfy them. And this cannot be done, wielenberg claims, 
because it is clear that the vast majority of desires of this sort involve ob-
jects (e.g., Apollo or the elysian Fields) that do not exist.
This is a sound criticism, and it can be pressed further. Along simi-
lar lines, we might distinguish between instinctive biological desires and 
what we might call natural fantasies—wishful desires that, while not nec-
essarily innate, are so common or arise so spontaneously in normal hu-
man beings as to be endemic in our species. examples of such natural 
fantasies might include desires to fly or possess magical abilities, to travel 
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to distant worlds, to commune with animals or nonhuman beings, and so 
forth. All of these can fairly be described as “natural” desires, shared by 
all or nearly all normal human beings. So, too, is the natural fantasy to live 
forever and achieve ultimate happiness in union with the summum bonum, 
God. but there is no reason to think that all or even most natural fantasies 
have objects that can satisfy them. why, then, unless there is something 
compellingly different about it, should we think that our wishful desire to 
achieve infinite happiness with God has an object that can satisfy it? 
Is Lewis’s argument from desire thus of no evidential value? by no 
means. For the convinced theist, one who reasonably believes on other 
grounds that God is loving and faithful, the experience of Joy, and more 
generally the desire for eternal happiness and union with God, can indeed 
provide support for belief in life after death. As Aquinas argues, it does 
seem that if there is a loving, all-perfect being God, he would not frustrate 
our deep human longing for what the Cambridge Platonist John Smith 
called “a blissful fruition of himself.” what this means is that Lewis’s ar-
gument must be seen—as it was almost certainly intended—as part of a 
cumulative case for the Christian faith.
wielenberg’s God and the Reach of Reason offers an admiring yet critical 
appraisal of Lewis’s principal arguments for Christian belief. It is must 
reading for Lewis fans who value—as Lewis himself pre-eminently did—
clear prose and rigorous logic.
The Uses of Paradox: Religion, Self-Transformation, and the Absurd, by Matthew 
bagger. Columbia University Press, 2007. Pp. 152. $36.50 (cloth)
STePHeN S. bUSH, brown University
In The Uses of Paradox, Matthew Bagger examines the status of paradox 
in various religious and philosophical texts, concentrating especially on 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Søren Kierkegaard, but giving attention to Ch-
uang-Tzu, Nāgārjuna, and Pyrrhonian sceptics as well. Drawing on cogni-
tive dissonance theory in psychology, bagger notes that most people who 
have grounds to accept contradictory beliefs are motivated to avoid self-
contradiction either by demonstrating that despite initial appearances the 
beliefs are in fact compatible or by rejecting one or more of the beliefs. 
what is of interest to him, however, is that despite this psychological ten-
dency to eliminate contradiction, a number of religious and philosophical 
authors esteem paradox and, in doing so, actively embrace the dissonance 
of contradiction.
The principal argument of Uses of Paradox concerns cases in which 
individuals embrace paradox. The heart of the book, in the second and 
third chapters, advances two principal claims. First, bagger wants to say 
that when a religious person embraces paradox, he or she typically puts 
